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Abstract. Stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms are widely
used in sponsored search auctions, crowdsourcing, online procurement,
etc. Existing stochastic MAB mechanisms with a deterministic payment
rule, proposed in the literature, necessarily suffer a regret of Ω(T 2/3),
where T is the number of time steps. This happens because the exist-
ing mechanisms consider the worst case scenario where the means of the
agents’ stochastic rewards are separated by a very small amount that de-
pends on T . We make, and, exploit the crucial observation that in most
scenarios, the separation between the agents’ rewards is rarely a function
of T . Moreover, in the case that the rewards of the arms are arbitrarily
close, the regret contributed by such sub-optimal arms is minimal. Our
idea is to allow the center to indicate the resolution, ∆, with which the
agents must be distinguished. This immediately leads us to introduce
the notion of ∆-Regret. Using sponsored search auctions as a concrete
example (the same idea applies for other applications as well), we pro-
pose a dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually
rational (IR), deterministic MAB mechanism, based on ideas from the
Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) family of MAB algorithms. Remark-
ably, the proposed mechanism ∆-UCB achieves a ∆-regret of O(log T )
for the case of sponsored search auctions. We first establish the results
for single slot sponsored search auctions and then non-trivially extend
the results to the case where multiple slots are to be allocated.
1 Introduction
Multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms [8] are now widely used to model and
solve problems where decisions are required to be made sequentially at every
time step and there is an exploration - exploitation dilemma. This dilemma is
the tradeoff that the planner faces in deciding whether to explore arms that
may yield higher rewards in the future or exploit the arms that have already
yielded high rewards in the past. If the rewards are generated from fixed dis-
tributions with unknown parameters, the setting goes by the name stochastic
MAB [8]. Popular algorithms in the stochastic MAB setting include Upper Con-
fidence Bound (UCB) based algorithms [2] and Thompson Sampling [1] based
algorithms. These algorithms incur O(log T ) regret where T is the total number
of rounds or time steps.
When the arms are controlled by strategic agents, we need to tackle addi-
tional challenges. Mechanism design has been applied in this context, leading to
stochastic MAB mechanisms. An immediate example is sponsored search auc-
tions (SSA). In SSA, there are several advertisers who wish to display their ads
along with the search results generated in response to a query from an internet
user. In the standard model, an advertiser has only one ad to display. We use the
terms agent, ad, and advertiser interchangeably. There are two components that
are of interest to the planner or the search engine, (1) stochastic component : click
through rate (CTR) of the ads or the probability that a displayed ad receives
a click (2) strategic component : valuation of the agent for every click that the
agent’s ad receives. The search engine would seek to allocate a slot to an ad which
has the maximum social welfare (product of click through rate and valuation).
However neither the CTRs nor the valuations of the agents are known. This
calls for a learning algorithm to learn the stochastic component (click through
rate) as well as a mechanism to elicit the strategic component (valuation). This
problem could become much harder as the agents may manipulate the learning
process [4, 13] to gain higher utilities.
For single slot SSA, it is known that any deterministic MAB mechanism (that
is, a MAB mechanism with a deterministic allocation and payment rule) suffers
a regret of Ω(T 2/3) [4]. Furthermore, there exists a deterministic MAB mecha-
nism with regret matching the theoretical lower bound [4] and also satisfies the
strongest notion of truthfulness (a posteriori to the clicks). When a more relaxed
notion of truthfulness is targeted (truthfulness in expectation of the clicks), the
regret guarantee improves to O(T 1/2) [3]. The regret can be further improved
when randomized mechanisms are used and in fact the regret in this space is
O(log T ) [3]. However, the high variance that is inevitable to the payments in
randomized mechanisms is a serious deterrent to the use of randomized mecha-
nisms.
We observe that the characterization provided by Babaioff et al. [4] targets
the worst case scenario. In particular, in the lower bound proof of Ω(T 2/3), they
consider an example scenario where the separation, ∆, between the expected
rewards of the arms is a function of T . We note that when a similar example (∆ =
T−1) is used with the popular UCB algorithm [2], linear regret is obtained, even
in the non-strategic case. Hence, a dependence of∆ on T is severely restrictive for
the case when the rewards are stochastic, even when the arms are non-strategic.
We make the observation that ∆ is in most situations independent of T and
the planner is knowledgeable enough to specify an appropriate value of ∆. This
motivates our main idea in this paper, which is to provide the planner an option
to specify a parameter ∆, which is the tolerance or distinguishing level for sub-
optimal arms. The understanding is that any arm that is within ∆ from the
best arm will not cause any additional regret to the planner. This notion of ∆
tolerance will require an appropriate definition of regret, which we call ∆-regret.
We propose an exploration separated mechanism based on UCB, which achieves
a ∆-regret of O(log T ). This mechanism can be readily applied in several settings
such as SSA, crowdsourcing, and online procurement. For the rest of the paper,
however, we use SSA as a running example.
Contributions
Our contributions are the following:
(1) We make the crucial observation that in most MAB scenarios, the separation
between the agents’ rewards is rarely a function of T (the number of time steps).
Moreover, in the case that the rewards of the arms are arbitrarily close, the regret
contributed by such sub-optimal arms is negligible. We exploit this observation
to allow the center to specify the resolution, ∆, with which the agents must be
distinguished. We introduce the notion of ∆-Regret to formalize this regret.
(2) Using sponsored search auctions as a concrete example, we propose a domi-
nant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) MAB
mechanism with a deterministic allocation and payment rule, based on ideas from
the UCB family of MAB algorithms. The proposed mechanism ∆-UCB achieves
a ∆-regret of O(log T ) for the case of single slot sponsored search auctions. The
truthfulness achieved by ∆-UCB is a posteriori to the click realizations and is
the strongest form of truthfulness.
(3) We non-trivially extend the above results to the case where multiple slots are
to be allocated. Here again, our mechanism is DSIC, IR, and achieves a ∆-regret
that is O(log T ).
We emphasize that our results are generic to stochastic MAB mechanisms
and can be applied to other popular applications such as crowdsourcing and
online procurement.
2 Related Work
In the area of MAB mechanisms, a lot of work has been done in sponsored search
auctions. Babaioff et al. [4] provide a characterization of truthful MAB mecha-
nisms, wherein the objective is to maximize social welfare. They introduce the
notion of influential rounds. The influential rounds are the rounds where the pa-
rameters of reward distributions (CTRs) are learnt. One of the characterizations
of truthful deterministic mechanisms is that the allocation must be exploration
separated, that is, in such influential rounds, the allocation must not depend on
the bids of the agents. The allocation is also required to be point wise monotone.
One of the main results of their paper is that any truthful, deterministic MAB
mechanism incurs a regret of Ω(T 2/3). They also provide a mechanism which in-
curs a matching upper bound regret of O(T 2/3). Devanur et. al. [9] concurrently
provide similar bounds on the regret when the objective is revenue maximization
rather than social welfare maximization.
All the above results pertain to the setting of single slot auctions where there
is a single slot for which the agents compete. In the generalization of this setting
multiple slots are reserved for ads. This setting is more challenging as every
slot is not identical and some slots are more prominent than the others. MAB
mechanisms have also been extended to the multiple slot setting [11] in line
with the characterization in [4]. Hence, a similar regret of O(T 2/3) on the social
welfare has been attained here as well.
MAB mechanisms have also been proposed in the context of crowdsourc-
ing [7]. Some of these mechanisms incur a regret of O(log T ). This is rendered
possible due to the specific nature of the problem in hand. In particular, Bhat
et al. [5] look at divisible tasks. Jain et al. [14] look at deterministic mechanisms
where a block of tasks is allocated to each agent and provide a weaker notion of
truthfulness.
The lower bound of both of social welfare regret as well as regret in the
revenue of Ω(T 2/3) have influenced subsequent research to follow similar as-
sumptions and thereby obtain a similar regret. However, we show in this work
that it is indeed possible to design a deterministic mechanism which attains loga-
rithmic regret and is also truthful in the dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) [15] sense. DSIC, of course, is the most preferred form of truthfulness.
This work opens up the possibility for a planner to move away from the worst
case scenario to a realistic scenario.
3 The Model: Single Slot SSA
We now describe our SSA setting. Let K be the number of agents or arms.
We denote the set of arms by [K]. Each of the K arms, when pulled, give
rewards from distributions with unknown parameters. We assume here, that the
form of the distributions are known but the parameters of the distribution are
unknown. In SSA, the rewards of the arms correspond to clicks. The clicks for the
advertisements are assumed to be generated from Bernoulli distributions with
parameters µ1, µ2, . . . , µK where µi is the CTR or probability that advertisement
i receives a click once observed. The means µ1, . . . , µK are unknown.
A click realization ρ represents the click information of every agent at all
rounds, that is, ρi(t) = 1 if agent i received a click in round t. In a round t, only
the click information of the allocated agent is revealed after the completion of
the round. Click information of all other unallocated agents is never known to
the planner.
The agents also have their valuations for each click they receive. We work in
the ‘pay per click’ setting where the agent pays the search engine for each click
received. Let the true valuation of agent i be vi for a click. vi is a private type of
agent i and is never known to the learner. However the agent is asked to bid his
valuation. Let the bid of agent i be bi. We denote by a vector b = (b1, . . . , bK) the
bid profile of all the agents. The central planner wants to ensure that the agents
bid their true valuations, that is bi must be equal to vi. Assume that there is a
single slot which must be allocated to one of the K agents. We denote by Wi
the social welfare when agent i is allocated a slot, that is, Wi = µivi. The social
welfare represents the expected valuation of agent i per click. If the CTRs of the
agents as well as their valuations were known, the planner would have selected
the arm with the maximum social welfare, that is, µivi. However neither µi nor
vi is known to the planner. Assume vmax is the maximum valuation that any
agent can have and is common knowledge.
A mechanism M = 〈A, P 〉 is a tuple containing an allocation rule A and a
payment rule P . At every time step or round t, the allocation rule acts on a bid
profile b of the agents as well as click realization ρ and allocates the slot to one
of the K agents, say i. Then A(b, ρ, t) = i. Alternatively we denote the indicator
variable Ai(b, ρ, t) = 1[A(b, ρ, t) = i]. The payment rule P
t = (P t1 , P
t
2 , . . . , P
t
K),
where P ti (b, ρ) is the payment to be made by agent i at time t upon receiving
a click, when the bids are b and for click realization ρ. As stated earlier ρi(t) of
the allocated agent alone is observed. Also note that the allocation as well as
payments in each round t only depends on the click histories till that round.
Symbol Description
K, [K] No. of agents and agent set
µi CTR of agent i
vi Valuation of agent i for each click
Wi Social welfare when agent i is allocated
ρi(t) Click realization of agent i at time t
vmax Maximum valuation over all agents
bi Bid of agent i
b Bid profile of all agents
b−i Bid profile of all agents except agent i
Ni,t No. of times agent i has been selected till time t
A(b, ρ, t) Allocation at time t for bid profile b and click realization ρ
i∗ Agent with maximum social welfare, ideally must be allocated at every time
step
W∗ Social welfare when agent i∗ is allocated
∆ Input parameter by center to indicate the level at which the agents must be
distinguished
S∆ Set of agents whose social welfare is less than ∆ away from i∗. These agents
do not contribute to ∆-regret.
µ̂+i,t UCB index corresponding to µi at time t
µ̂−i,t LCB index corresponding to µi at time t
µ̂i,t Empirical CTR of agent i estimated from samples up to time t
P ti Payment charged to agent i if he is allocated a slot at time t and he gets a
click
Table 1. Notations for the single slot SSA setting
Let i∗ be the arm with the largest social welfare, that is, i∗ = argmaxi∈[K]Wi.
We denote the corresponding social welfare as W∗ = maxi∈[K] µivi. We denote
by It the agent chosen at time t as a shorthand for A(b, ρ, t). For any given
∆ > 0, define the set S∆ = {i ∈ [K] : W∗ −Wi < ∆}. S∆ denotes the set of all
agents separated from the best arm i∗ with a social welfare less than ∆. These
arms are therefore indistinguishable for the center and they contribute zero to
the regret. Note that ∆ is a parameter that the center fixes based on the amount
in dollars he is willing to tradeoff for choosing sub-optimal arms, given he has
only a fixed time horizon T to his disposal. To capture this revised and more
practical notion of regret, we introduce the metric ∆-regret. Formally,
∆-regret =
T∑
t=1
(W∗ −WIt)1 [It ∈ [K] \ S∆] (1)
The center suffers a regret only when an agent with a social welfare greater
than ∆ away from W∗ is chosen. ∆-regret captures this loss. The goal of our
mechanism is to select agents at every round t to minimize the ∆-regret.
4 Our Mechanism: ∆-UCB
We are now ready to describe our mechanism ∆-UCB. The idea in ∆-UCB is
to explore all the arms in a round-robin fashion for a fixed number of rounds.
The number of exploration rounds is fixed based on the desired ∆, specified by
the planner. At the end of exploration, with high probability, we are guaranteed
that the arms not in S∆ are well separated from the best arm i∗ with respect
to their social welfare estimates. In the exploration rounds, agents need not pay
and these rounds are free.
Further on, for all the remaining rounds, the best arm as per the UCB esti-
mate of social welfare is chosen. However in the exploitation rounds, the chosen
agent pays an amount for each click he receives. The amount to be paid by the
agent is fixed based on the well known Vickrey Clark Grove (VCG) scheme [16].
Note that no learning place in these rounds and the UCB, LCB indices don’t
change thereafter. We present our mechanism in Algorithm 1.
5 Properties of ∆-UCB
Next we discuss the properties satisfied by ∆-UCB regarding truthfulness and
regret. Before that, we state a few useful definitions which will help in under-
standing the notion of truthfulness.
At any time step, every agent obtains some utility by participating in the
mechanism. This utility is a function of his bid, valuation, bids of other agents
and his click realization. Let Θi denote the space of bids of agent i. b−i =
(b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bK) is the bid profile containing bids of all agents except
agent i. Let Θ−i denote the space of bids of all agents other than agent i. There-
fore Θ−i = Θ1 × . . . ,×Θi−1 ×Θi+1 × . . .×ΘK . We denote by ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi)
the utility to agent i at time t when his bid is bi, his valuation is vi, the bid
profile of the remaining agents is b−i and the click realization is ρ. All agents
are assumed to be rational and are interested in maximizing their own utilities.
In our setting the utility to an agent i is computed as,
ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = (vi − P
t
i (b, ρ))Ai(bi, b−i, ρ, t)ρi(t) (2)
Algorithm 1 ∆-UCB Mechanism
Input:
T : Time horizon, K: number of agents
∆ : parameter fixed by the center
vmax : Maximum valuation of the agents
Elicit bids b = (b1, b2, . . . , bK) from all the agents
Initialize µ̂i,0 = 0, Ni,0 = 0 ∀i ∈ [K]
u = 8Kv2max log T/∆
2
for t = 1, . . . , u do ⊲ Exploration rounds
It = ((t− 1) mod K) + 1 ⊲ Round-robin exploration
NIt,t = NIt,t−1 + 1
A(b, ρ, t) = It ⊲ Allocate slot to agent It and observe ρIt(t)
µ̂It,t = (µ̂It,t−1NIt,t−1 + ρIt(t))/NIt,t
ǫIt,t =
√
2 log T/NIt,t
µ̂+It,t = µ̂It,t + ǫIt,t
µ̂−It,t = µ̂It,t − ǫIt,t
µ̂+i,t = µ̂
+
i,t−1 ∀i ∈ [K] \ {It}
µ̂−i,t = µ̂
−
i,t−1 ∀i ∈ [K] \ {It}
P ti (b, ρ) = 0 ∀i ∈ [K] ⊲ Free rounds
end for
iˆ∗ = argmaxi∈[K] µ̂
+
i,ubi
j = argmaxi∈[K]\{̂i∗} µ̂
+
i,ubi
P = µ̂+j,ubj/µ̂
+
iˆ∗,u
for t = u+ 1, . . . , T do ⊲ Exploitation rounds
A(b, ρ, t) = iˆ∗
P t
iˆ∗
(b, ρ) = P × ρiˆ∗(t) ⊲ Agent pays only for a click
P ti (b, ρ) = 0 ∀i ∈ [K] \ {ˆi∗}
µ̂+i,t = µ̂
+
i,u, µ̂
−
i,t = µ̂
−
i,u ∀i ∈ [K] ⊲ No more learning
end for
The idea behind the computation of the utility is as follows. If an agent i does
not receive an allocation (that is, Ai(bi, b−i, ρ, t) = 0), his utility is also zero.
He gets a non-zero utility only if he receives an allocation. If he receives an
allocation and also a click (ρi(t) = 1), then his utility is the difference between
his valuation for the click and the amount he has to pay to the search engine
(vi − P
t
i (b, ρ)). If he does not receive a click (ρi(t) = 0), his utility is zero.
Definition 1. Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) [4]: A mecha-
nism M = 〈A, P 〉 is said to be dominant strategy incentive compatible if ∀i ∈
[K], ∀bi ∈ Θi, ∀b−i ∈ Θ−i, ∀ρ, ∀t, ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) ≥ ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi).
Note that in the above definition, the truthfulness is demanded a posteriori to
even the click realization [11]. Hence it is the strongest notion of truthfulness.
Examples for weaker forms of truthfulness include those which take expectation
over click realizations.
Definition 2. Individually Rational (IR): A mechanism M = 〈A, P 〉 is said to
be individually rational if ∀i ∈ [K], ∀b−i ∈ Θ−i, ∀ρ, ∀t, ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) ≥ 0.
Theorem 1. ∆-UCB mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)
and individually rational (IR).
Proof. We analyze the scenarios where an agent i bids his true valuation and
receives an allocation and also when he does not. We show that in both these
scenarios, bidding his true valuation vi is indeed a best response strategy. We
only need to consider the exploitation rounds because in the exploration rounds,
every agent is allocated a fixed number of rounds independent of his bids and
these rounds are also free for agents.
Case 1: Ai(vi, b−i, ρ, t) = 1
This implies that when the agent bids his true valuation, he gets an alloca-
tion. Therefore µ̂+i,tvi > µ̂
+
l,tbl for all the other agents l. In particular, let agent
j be such that j = argmaxl∈[K]\{i} µ̂
+
l,tbl. The amount to be paid by agent
i is P ti (vi, b−i, ρ) = µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t. If he receives a click then ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) =
vi − µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t > 0.
Overbid: If agent i bids a value bi > vi, he continues to receive an allocation and
his payment is still the same,
P ti (bi, b−i, ρ) = µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t. Therefore his utility continues to be ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) =
vi − µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t = ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi). Therefore he does not benefit from an over-
bid.
Underbid: Suppose agent i bids a value bi < vi.
Case a: If bi is such that µ̂
+
i,tbi < µ̂
+
j,tbj, the he fails to get an allocation as
A(bi, b−i, ρ, t) = j 6= i. Then the utility to agent i is ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = 0 <
ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi). Therefore he clearly loses his utility by such an underbid.
Case b: Suppose bi is such that µ̂
+
i,tvi > µ̂
+
i,tbi > µ̂
+
j,tbj . That is agent i bids
in such a way that he wins the allocation even with an underbid. Then, if he
gets a click, the amount he must pay to the center is P ti (bi, b−i, ρ) = µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t.
Therefore his utility ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = vi − µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t = ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi). He
obtains the same utility as a truthful bid and there is no benefit from such an
underbid.
Case 2: Ai(vi, b−i, ρ, t) = 0
This implies that when the agent bids his true valuation, he does not get an
allocation. Suppose agent j wins the allocation. A(vi, b−i, ρ, t) = j and µ̂
+
i,tvi <
µ̂+j,tbj .
Truthful bid: Since agent i does not win an allocation with a truthful bid, his
utility ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = 0
Overbid: Suppose agent i bids in such a way that bi > vi. We have two sub-cases
here.
Case a: If bi is such that µ̂
+
i,tvi < µ̂
+
j,tbj < µ̂
+
i,tbi, then agent i wins the
allocation. So, Ai(bi, b−i, ρ, t) = 1. If he gets a click, he now has to make a
payment P ti (bi, b−i, ρ) = µ̂
+
j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t. Now his utility ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = vi −
µ̂+j,tbj/µ̂
+
i,t < 0. And in particular ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) < ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = 0.
Therefore, such an overbid is clearly disadvantageous compared to a truthful
bid.
Case b: Suppose µ̂+i,tvi < µ̂
+
i,tbi < µ̂
+
j,tbj . The overbid by agent i is not
sufficient to make him win the allocation and agent j wins the allocation,
A(bi, b−i, ρ, t) = j. The utility of agent i, ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = 0 = ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi).
Therefore there is no advantage for agent i by this case of overbid.
Underbid: If agent i bids in such a way that bi < vi, he continues to lose the
allocation and therefore his utility,
ui(bi, b−i, ρ, t; vi) = 0 = ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t; vi). Since, the utility by an underbid re-
mains the same as a truthful bid, there is clearly no advantage in underbidding.
All the above cases show that our mechanism is DSIC a posteriori to the click
realizations. Also, in each of the above cases, note that the utility of an agent
i, ui(vi, b−i, ρ, t) ≥ 0. Therefore, by truthful bidding he never gets a negative
utility. This proves that our mechanism is individually rational.
We next discuss the regret incurred by ∆-UCB. In order to prove the regret
results, we will first need to prove several other lemmas.
Lemma 1. Social Welfare UCB index: For an agent i, we define the social
welfare UCB indices for agent i as,
Ŵ+i,t = µ̂i,tvi + ǫi,tvi = µ̂i,tvi +
√
2
v2i logT
Ni,t
(3)
Ŵ−i,t = µ̂i,tvi − ǫi,tvi = µ̂i,tvi −
√
2
v2i logT
Ni,t
(4)
Then, ∀t P
({
ω : Wi /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,t(ω), Ŵ
+
i,t(ω)])
})
≤ T−4.
Proof. Let µ̂+i,t and µ̂
−
i,t denote the UCB and LCB indices for the estimate µ̂i.
Then the events {ω : µi /∈ [µ̂
−
i,t(ω), µ̂
+
i,t(ω)]}, {ω : Wi /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,t(ω), Ŵ
+
i,t(ω)]} are
identical. So, P (Wi /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,t, Ŵ
+
i,t]) = P (µi /∈ [µ̂
−
i,t, µ̂
+
i,t]). An application of Ho-
effding bound [12] gives P (µi /∈ [µ̂
−
i,t, µ̂
+
i,t]) ≤ exp(−2Ni,tǫ
2
i,t). As per the mecha-
nism ǫi,t =
√
2 logT/Ni,t. So P (µi /∈ [µ̂
−
i,t, µ̂
+
i,t]) ≤ exp(−2Ni,t × 2 logT/Ni,t) =
T−4.
Lemma 2. Suppose at time step t, Ni,t >
8v2max log T
∆2 ∀i ∈ [K]. Then ∀i ∈ [K],
2ǫi,tvi < ∆.
Proof. Given that Ni,t >
8v2max log T
∆2 . Therefore,
∆2 >
8v2max logT
Ni,t
≥
8v2i logT
Ni,t
≥ 4
[
2v2i logT
Ni,t
]
Taking square roots on both sides of the above equation yields ∆ > 2ǫi,tvi
thereby proving the lemma.
Lemma 3. For an agent i and time step t, let Bi,t be the event Bi,t = {ω :Wi /∈
[Ŵ−i,t, Ŵ
+
i,t]}. Define the event G =
⋂
t
⋂
i∈[K]
Bci,t, where B
c
i,t is the complement of
Bi,t. Then P (G) ≥ 1−
1
T 2 .
Proof. From Lemma 1, the probability of the ‘bad’ event, P (Bi,t) ≤ T
−4.
P (G) = P
(⋂
t
⋂
i
Bci,t
)
= 1− P
((⋂
t
⋂
i
Bci,t
)c)
= 1− P
(⋃
t
⋃
i
Bi,t
)
= 1−
∑
t
∑
i∈[K]
P (Bi,t)
≥ 1−
∑
t
∑
i∈[K]
T−4 ≥ 1−
1
T 2
The last statement follows by summing over all rounds and using the fact that
K ≪ T .
Theorem 2. Suppose at time step t, Nj,t >
8v2max log T
∆2
∀j ∈ [K]. Then ∀i ∈ [K] \ S∆, Ŵ
+
i∗,t
> Ŵ+i,t with high probability (= 1− 2/T
4).
Proof: In Theorem 1, we have shown that ∆-UCB is DSIC. Therefore, all the
agents bid their valuations truthfully, bi = vi ∀i ∈ [K]. Suppose in exploitation
round t, a sub-optimal arm is pulled. Therefore, Ŵ+i,t ≥ Ŵ
+
i∗,t
. Then one of the
following three conditions must have happened.
Condition 1: Wi < Ŵ
−
i,t. This condition implies a drastic overestimate of the
sub-optimal arm i so that the true social welfareWi is even below the LCB index
Ŵ−i,t. The figure below shows this case.
Wi
Ŵ−i,t Ŵ
+
i,t
Condition 2: W∗ > Ŵ
+
i∗,t
. This implies an underestimate of the optimal arm
so that the true social welfare W∗ lies above even the UCB index Ŵ
+
i∗,t
. See
subsequent figure.
W∗
Ŵ−i∗,t Ŵ
+
i∗,t
Condition 3: W∗ −Wi < 2ǫi,tvi. This implies an overlap in the confidence
intervals of the optimal and sub-optimal arm. Even though Conditions 1 and
2 are false, still the UCB of sub-optimal arm i is greater than the UCB of the
optimal arm i∗.
Ŵ−i,t Ŵ
−
i∗,t
Ŵ+i∗,t Ŵ
+
i,t
Wi W∗
From the above figure, W∗ −Wi ≤ Ŵ
+
i,t − Ŵ
−
i,t ≤ 2ǫi,t
If all the three conditions above were false, then,
Ŵ+i∗,t > W∗ > Wi + 2ǫi,tvi > Ŵ
−
i,t + 2ǫi,tvi = Ŵ
+
i,t
This implies that Ŵ+i∗,t > Ŵ
+
i,t, leading to a contradiction.
As per the statement of the theorem,Ni,t >
8v2max log T
∆2 . Therefore by Lemma 2,
2ǫi,tvi < ∆. For i ∈ [K] \ S∆, W∗ −Wi > ∆ > 2ǫi,tvi. So Condition 3 above
does not hold true. So if the sub-optimal arm i must have been pulled, only
possibilities are for Condition 1 or 2.
P (Ŵ+i,t >Ŵ
+
i∗,t
) ≤ P (Condition 1) + P (Condition 2)
≤ P (Bi,t) + P (Bi∗,t) ≤ 2/T
−4
P (Ŵ+i∗,t > Ŵ
+
i,t) = 1− P (Ŵ
+
i,t > Ŵ
+
i∗,t
) ≥ 1−
2
T 4
thereby completing the proof.
We are now ready to state our main result on the incurred regret.
Theorem 3. If the ∆-UCB mechanism is executed for a total time horizon of
T rounds, it achieves an expected ∆-regret of O(log T ).
Proof. The main idea in the proof is to compute the ∆-regret conditional on
two events - G and Gc and then to find a bound for these two conditional
expectations.
E [∆-regret|G] = E
[
∆-regret|∀t, ∀i Wi ∈ [Ŵ
−
i,t, Ŵ
+
i,t]
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
(W∗ −WIt)1 [It ∈ [K] \ S∆] |∀t, ∀i Wi ∈ [Ŵ
−
i,t, Ŵ
+
i,t]
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
(W∗ −WIt)1 [It ∈ [K] \ S∆] |WIt ∈ [Ŵ
−
It,t
, Ŵ+It,t]
]
=
8Kv3max logT
∆2
The last step comes from the fact that Conditions 1 and 2 in the proof of
Theorem 2 are eliminated as we are given that the event G has occurred. After
exploration rounds, Ni,t ≥ 8Kv
2
max logT/∆
2. From Theorem 2, no ∆-regret
occurs during exploitation since G is true. Therefore the regret is only incurred
during the exploration rounds.
We now compute E [∆-regret|Gc].
E [∆-regret|Gc] ≤ Tvmax (5)
But P (Gc) = 1− P (G) < 1T 2 from Lemma 3.
Putting all the steps together,
E [∆-regret] = E [∆-regret|G]P (G) + E [∆-regret|Gc]P (Gc)
≤
8Kv3max logT
∆2
∗ 1 + Tvmax ∗
1
T 2
≤
8Kv3max logT
∆2
+ 1 (6)
The second term is less than 1 as vmax ≪ T . This completes the proof.
6 Extension to Multi-Slot SSA
In the previous sections, we assumed that there was a single slot for which the
advertisers were competing. We now look at a more general setting where there
are M slots to be allocated to the K agents. As before, each advertiser has
exactly one ad for display and the CTR for advertisement i is denoted by µi.
Recall that in the case of single slot auctions, the CTR exactly denoted the
probability with which an ad received a click. However in the generalized setting
of multi-slot auctions, an additional parameter comes into play while computing
the click probability.
Each position or slot m is associated with a parameter λm called ‘promi-
nence’. λm denotes the probability with which a user observes an ad at slot
m+ 1 given he has observed the ad at slot m. In order to understand the need
for this parameter, a useful scenario to imagine is the listing of web-pages in
Google for a query. There are two phases that one can think of once the listing
of pages or results have appeared.
Phase 1: This is the phase where a user scans through the pages listed. A page
listed higher up in the ranking (say second from the top) has more chances of
being observed by a user rather than a page that is far below in the ranking (say
fifth from the top). λ4, for instance, denotes the probability that a user observes
the fifth page, given he has observed the fourth page. Coming back to sponsored
ads, we assume that λ1 = 1, that is, the ad listed in the first slot is surely ob-
served. We denote by Γm the probability that an ad at slot m is observed. Γm
is computed as, Γm =
∏m−1
s=1 λs.
Phase 2: After having scanned through the list, the user decides to click one or
more of the shown ads. In the multi-slot setting [11], it is assumed that multiple
ads in a listing may receive clicks. The probability that ad i receives a click when
shown at slot m = Γmµi.
We assume that λm, m = 1, . . . ,M are known to the planner a-priori. The
problem of learning these parameters along with the CTR µ is much harder
due to the well-known identifiability problem. Approaches such as Expectation
Maximization (EM) [6] may be used but the guarantees for such approaches are
still open. Hence we work in the setting where the λs and hence Γ s are known.
The above modeling assumptions are as per standard conventions [10]. In the
multi-slot setting, the allocation is given to multiple agents at every time step.
We denote by A(b, ρ, t) ⊂ {1, . . . ,K}, the allocation at time t for bids b and click
realization ρ. The cardinality of the allocated set |A(b, ρ, t)| = M . We also use
the notation Ai(b, ρ, t) = m to denote the allocation to agent i at time t is slot
m, for the bid profile b, click realization ρ. If an agent i is not allocated any of
the M slots at time t, we say Ai(b, ρ, t) = 0.
We denote by Wi,m the social welfare of agent i, when he is given slot m.
Wi,m is the expected valuation an agent i receives when he is given slot m and
is computed as,
Wi,m = Γmµivi (7)
Symbol Description
M No. of slots
[M ] Set of M slots
λm Prominence (Probability with which a user observes an ad at slot m+1 given
he has observed the ad at slot m)
Γm Probability that an ad at slot m is observed
Wi,m Social welfare when agent i is allocated slot m
Ni,t No. of times agent i has been selected till time t over all slots
K(m) Optimal agent for slot m
W∗,m Social welfare when agent K
(m) is allocated slot m
S∆,m Set of agents whose social welfare is less than ∆ away from K
(m). These agents
do not contribute to ∆-regret when allocated slot m.
Table 2. Additional notations for multi-slot SSA
Having described the multi-slot setting, we now analyze the scenario from the
view of the search engine or central planner. In the ideal scenario, the planner
would like to allot the ads exactly to the top M agents with the largest social
welfare. This use case has been studied in the literature [11] and exploration sep-
arated mechanisms with regret of O(T 2/3) have been proposed. Various possible
allocations are explored for O(T 2/3) time steps for every agent after which the
allocation algorithm is guaranteed to converge to the ideal allocation with high
probability. As in the single slot case, O(T 2/3) exploration rounds are required
to distinguish all the agents perfectly from each other, when there are agents
whose social welfare values are arbitrarily close.
However, a much more practical problem of interest is to study and de-
sign mechanisms when the search engine is indifferent to a gap in ∆ in so-
cial welfare for every slot. We observe that in cases where the agents are well-
separated, O(T 2/3) exploration rounds are not required. In fact, O(log T ) explo-
ration rounds are sufficient to converge to an allocation that is well within the
requirements of the search engine.
Having explained the problem, we now formalize the notions of separatedness
in this setting. Let K(1), . . . ,K(M) ∈ [K] be the best M agents in terms of
their single slot social welfare values, that is, µK(1)vK(1) > µK(2)vK(2) > . . . >
µK(M)vK(M) . Let W∗,m = WK(m),m. The ideal solution would be to allocate
agent K(m) the slot m. This allocation would yield the largest social welfare but
in the worst case, when the agents’ social welfares are separated by a function
of T , converging to this optimal allocation would require O(T 2/3) exploration
rounds [11]. Instead, for a prescribed value of∆ fixed by the search engine, define
the set,
S∆,m =
{
i ∈ [K] :WK(m),m −Wi,m < ∆
}
. (8)
S∆,m is the set of all agents whose social welfare is at most∆ away from the agent
K(m) ( who should have ideally been given slot m). The planner is indifferent
to the regret contributed by the agents in S∆,m, if any of them are allotted slot
m. Hence we define the multi-slot ∆-regret metric as,
∆-regret =
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
(W∗,m −WIt,m,m)1 [IIt,m ∈ [K] \ S∆,m]
The ∆-UCB mechanism for the multi-slot SSA is given in Algorithm 2.
We analyze the regret and truthfulness of Algorithm 2. The lemmas and
theorems for establishing the results for the multi-slot setting are similar to the
single slot setting, however there are subtle differences in proving many of the
results. We will highlight them as and when necessary.
Theorem 4. In the multi-slot setting ∆−UCB is Dominant Strategy Incentive
Compatible (DSIC) and Individually Rational (IR). (Proof along the lines of
Theorem 1).
Lemma 4. For an agent i and slot m, the social welfare UCB indices for agent
i,
Ŵ+i,m,t = Γmµ̂i,tvi + ǫi,m,t
= Γmµ̂i,tvi +
√
2
v2i Γ
2
m logT
Ni,t
(9)
Ŵ−i,m,t = Γmµ̂i,tvi − ǫi,m,t
= Γmµ̂i,tvi −
√
2
v2i Γ
2
m logT
Ni,t
(10)
satisfy P (Wi,m /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,m,t, Ŵ
+
i,m,t])) ≤ T
−4 ∀t
Proof. The proof idea is similar to Lemma 1.
A noteworthy feature of our estimates is the following. An allocation of an ad i
in a slot m yields a sample for the computation of not only Ŵi,m,t, but also for
Ŵi,m′,t for all slots m
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. This is because Γm is known to the planner
a-priori. Therefore note that, the number of allocations that ad i receives till time
t, Ni,t is the sum of the number of allocations that agent i receives irrespective
of the slot or inclusive of all the slots.
Lemma 5. Suppose at time step t, Nj,t >
8v2max log T
∆2 ∀j ∈ [K]. Then ∀i ∈ [K]
and ∀m ∈ [M ], 2ǫi,m,t < ∆.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. For an agent i, slot m and time t, let Bi,m,t be the event Bi,m,t =
{ω : Wi,m /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,m,t(ω), Ŵ
+
i,m,t(ω)]}. Define the event G =
⋂
t
⋂
i
⋂
m
Bci,m,t. Then
P (G) ≥ 1− 1T 2 .
Proof: The proof has some subtle differences from Lemma 3 because in the multi-
slot extension, the events Bi,m,t are not independent across the slots.
Observation: If an element ω from the set of outcomes is such that ω ∈ Bi,m,t,
then ω ∈ Bi,m′,t ∀m
′ ∈ [M ]. This is because, for any two slots m and m′,
Wi,m /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,m,t, Ŵ
+
i,m,t] ⇐⇒ µi /∈ [µ̂
−
i,t, µ̂
+
i,t]
⇐⇒ Wi,m′ /∈ [Ŵ
−
i,m′,t, Ŵ
+
i,m′,t]
Therefore P (
⋃
mBi,m,t) = P (Bi,1,t). From Lemma 4,
P (
⋃
mBi,m,t) = P (Bi,1,t) ≤ T
−4. Hence,
P (G) = 1− P
(⋃
t
⋃
i
⋃
m
Bi,m,t
)
= 1− P
(⋃
t
⋃
i
Bi,1,t
)
≥ 1−
1
T 2
(inequality from Lemma 3).
Theorem 5. Suppose at time t, Nj,t > 8v
2
max logT/∆
2
∀j ∈ [K]. Then ∀m ∈ [M ], ∀i ∈ [K] \ S∆,m, Ŵ
+
K(m),m,t
> Ŵ+i,m,t with high
probability (= 1− 2/T 4).
Proof: Suppose at time t where Nj,t > 8v
2
max logT/∆
2 ∀j ∈ [K],, there exists
some m ∈ [M ] such that Ŵ+
K(m),m,t
< Ŵ+i,m,t. (Note that this statement does not
arise from any assumptions on the allocation, for instance, that agent i is given
slot m. This is the major difference from Theorem 2). But the relation between
the true social welfare values of these agents is WK(m),m > Wi,m. Then one of
the following three conditions must have occurred, like in proof of Theorem 2.
Wi,m
Ŵ−i,m,t Ŵ
+
i,m,t
Condition 1: Wi,m < Ŵ
−
i,m,t. This condition implies a drastic overestimate of
the sub-optimal arm i so that the true mean social welfare Wi,m is even below
the LCB index Ŵ−i,m,t. The figure below captures this condition.
Condition 2: WK(m),m > Ŵ
+
K(m),m,t
. This implies an underestimate of the op-
timal arm so that the true mean social welfareWK(m),m lies above even the UCB
index Ŵ+
K(m),m,t
. See figure below.
ŴK(m),m
Ŵ−
K(m),m,t
Ŵ+
K(m),m,t
Condition 3: WK(m),m −Wi,m < 2ǫi,m,t. This implies an overlap in the confi-
dence intervals of the optimal and sub-optimal arm. Even if, Conditions 1 and
2 are false, still the UCB of sub-optimal arm i is greater than the UCB of the
optimal arm i∗.
Ŵ−i,m,t Ŵ
−
K(m),m,t
Ŵ+
K(m),m,t Ŵ
+
i,m,t
Wi,m WK(m),m
From the figure,WK(m),m−Wi,m ≤ Ŵ
+
i,m,t−Ŵ
−
i,m,t ≤ 2ǫi,m,t. If all the three
conditions above were false, then,
Ŵ+
K(m),m,t
> WK(m),m > Wi,m + 2ǫi,t > Ŵ
−
i,m,t + 2ǫi,t
= Ŵ+i,m,t ( A contradiction!)
As per the statement of the theorem, Ni,t > 8v
2
max log T/∆
2. Therefore by
Lemma 5, 2ǫi,m,t < ∆. For agent i ∈ [K]\S∆,m, WK(m),m−Wi,m > ∆ > 2ǫi,m,t.
Therefore, Condition 3 above does not hold true. So,
P (Ŵ+i,m,t >Ŵ
+
K(m),m,t
) ≤ P (Condition 1) + P (Condition 2)
≤ P (Bi,m,t) + P (BK(m),m,t) ≤ 2/T
−4
P (Ŵ+
K(m),m,t
> Ŵ+i,m,t) = 1− P (Ŵ
+
i,m,t > Ŵ
+
K(m),m,t
)
≥ 1−
2
T 4
Theorem 6. If the ∆-UCB mechanism is executed in the multiple slot scenario
for a total time horizon of T rounds, it achieves an expected ∆-regret of O(log T ).
Proof. The proof idea has some subtle differences from the proof of Theorem 3.
As before, we first compute the expected ∆-regret conditional on G. For the
exploration rounds, the mechanism obtains a regret of ξ =
8MKv3max log T
∆2 .
E [∆-regret|G] ≤ ξ+
T∑
t=E
M∑
m=1
(WK(m),m −W(It,m),m)1 [It,m ∈ K \ S∆,m|G]
We will now show that the second term above evaluates to zero. For any m,
the cardinality of S∆,m is at least m. This is because for all K
(j) above m in
the ranking of agents (j < m), WK(m),m − WK(j),m < 0 < ∆ as WK(j),m >
WK(m),m. Therefore there are at least m− 1 agents in S∆,m. Also K
(m) ∈ S∆,m
asWK(m),m−WK(m),m = 0 < ∆. Therefore ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},K
(j) ∈ S∆,m. While
allocating slot m, at least one of the agents in S∆,m must be free. This is by the
pigeonhole principle. Now if the allocated agent for slot m, It,m ∈ [K] \ S∆,m,
one of the following two cases occur.
Case 1: The ideal agentsK(1), . . . ,K(m−1) for all the previous slots 1, . . . ,m− 1
have already been allocated before the allocation of slotm. This means thatK(m)
has not been allocated yet. Also, Ŵ+(It,m),m,ξ > Ŵ
+
K(m),m,ξ
. Since G is true and
t > ξ, the above event cannot occur (by Theorem 5).
Case 2: The agent K(m) has already been allocated to some other slot before
the allocation of slot m has begun. Therefore there is some agent K(j), j < m
with a larger social welfare value, who has still not been allocated. That is,
WK(j),m > WK(m),m > W(It,m),m. Given that It,m /∈ S∆,m. Therefore we can
deduce that It,m /∈ S∆,j . This is because,
WK(m),m −W(It,m),m ≥ ∆
=⇒ WK(j),m −W(It,m),m ≥ ∆
=⇒ µK(j)vK(j) − µIt,mvIt,m ≥ ∆/Γm
=⇒ Γj(µK(j)vK(j) − µIt,mvIt,m) ≥ Γj∆/Γm
=⇒ WK(j),j −W(It,m),j ≥ ∆ (11)
The last line in the above implications is true as Γj > Γm. But Ŵ
+
K(j) ,m,ξ
<
Ŵ+(It,m),m,ξ. Then the inequality Ŵ
+
K(j) ,j,ξ
< Ŵ+(It,m),j,ξ is also true due to the
way the slot specific UCB indices are computed. From Theorem 5 for slot j, we
find that Ŵ+
K(j),j,ξ
> Ŵ+(It,m),j,ξ. Therefore we get that E [∆-regret|G] ≤ ξ.
Also, P (Gc) = 1− P (G) < 1T 2 from Lemma 6.
Putting all the steps together,
E [∆-regret] = E [∆-regret|G]P (G)
+ E [∆-regret|Gc]P (Gc)
≤
8KMv3max logT
∆2
∗ 1 + TMvmax ∗
1
T 2
≤
8KMv3max logT
∆2
+ vmax (12)
The simplification in the second line is because E [∆-regret|Gc] ≤ TMvmax. In
the last line we use the fact that M ≪ T . This completes the proof.
7 Conclusion
For the first time, we have addressed the realistic use case in MAB mechanisms
where a planner has the option to specify a tolerance level for sub-optimal arms.
The metric ∆-regret that we have introduced captures the notion of regret in
this scenario. We have provided a deterministic, truthful, exploration separated
MAB mechanism ∆-UCB which achieves a ∆-regret of O(log T ). In particular
we have analyzed the mechanism for sponsored search auctions for both single
slot SSA and multi-slot SSA. The results are generic and will apply equally well
to other applications as well.
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Algorithm 2 ∆-UCB Mechanism for multiple slot SSA
Input:
M : No. of slots, K: No. of agents, T : Time horizon
∆ : parameter fixed by the center
vmax : Maximum valuation of the agents
Elicit bids b = (b1, b2, . . . , bK) from all the agents
Initialize µ̂i,0 = 0, Ni,0 = 0 ∀i ∈ [K],
u = 8Kv2max log T/∆
2
for t = 1, . . . , u do ⊲ Exploration rounds
A(b, ρ, t) = φ
for m = 1, . . . ,M do
It,m = (((t− 1) mod K) +m− 1) mod K + 1
NIt,m,t = NIt,m,t−1 + 1
A(b, ρ, t) = A(b, ρ, t) ∪ It,m ⊲ Allocate It,m slot m and observe ρIt,m(t).
µ̂It,m,t = (µ̂It,m,t−1NIt,m,t−1 + ρIt,m (t))/NIt,m,t
ǫIt,m,t =
√
2 log T/NIt,m,t
µ̂+It,m,t = µ̂It,m,t + ǫIt,m,t
µ̂−It,t = µ̂It,m,t − ǫIt,m,t
end for
µ̂+i,t = µ̂
+
i,t−1, µ̂
−
i,t = µ̂
−
i,t−1 ∀i ∈ [K] \ A(b, ρ, t)
P ti (b, ρ) = 0 ∀i ∈ [K] ⊲ Free rounds
end for
K̂(1), K̂(2), . . . , K̂(M), . . . , K̂(K) = sorted list of agents in the decreasing order of
µ̂+i,ubi
for t = u+ 1, . . . , T do ⊲ Exploitation rounds
A(b, ρ, t) = φ
for m = 1, . . . ,M do
It,m = K̂
(m)
A(b, ρ, t) = A(b, ρ, t) ∪ K̂(m)
P t
K̂(m)
(b, ρ) =
∑M+1
l=m+1 (Γl−1 − Γl) µ̂
+
K(l),u
bK(l)ρK̂(m)(t)
end for
P ti (b, ρ) = 0 ∀i ∈ [K] \ A(b, ρ, t)
µ̂+i,t = µ̂
+
i,u, µ̂
−
i,t = µ̂
−
i,u ∀i ∈ [K] ⊲ No more learning
end for
